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The Responsibility of States 
for Environmental Harm in a Multinational 
Context—Problems and Trends 
Jutta B R U N N É E * 
The paper begins with a discussion of parallels between problems of 
environmental liability law at the national and international levels. At both 
levels, rules built upon concerns and priorities of another era had to be 
applied to the complex environmental problems of our times. Both systems 
have proven to be inadequate in addressing modern environmental con-
cerns and have evolved to better meet the challenge. 
The second part of the paper will highlight the shortcomings of the 
international system and the law of state responsibility. They are rooted in 
the system's focus on the interests of sovereign states and include the 
vagueness of the relevant rules, the disagreement as to the standard of 
liability (fault or strict liability), the perception of many polluting activities 
as « lawful », the system's reactive character, the system's failure to effec-
tively deal with ecological costs rather than injury to state interests. 
In its third part, the paper will survey developments and trends that 
may provide solutions to the aforementioned problems. Possible solutions 
include the emergence of rules that protect the common interests of the 
international community rather than the sovereign interests of states, the 
development of special liability regimes for more narrowly defined envi-
ronmental concerns (generally : ultrahazardous activities), efforts of the 
International Law Commission to develop a risk liability regime, the 
proliferation of regimes designed to prevent or manage environmental 
problems. 
* Professeure adjointe, Faculté de droit, Université McGill. 
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Le présent article comporte d'abord une discussion des parallèles 
entre les problèmes de la responsabilité pour les dommages environ-
nementaux aux niveaux national et international. Dans les deux cas, les 
règles établies pour des problèmes et priorités d'une autre époque devaient 
être appliquées aux problèmes complexes de Venvironnement de notre 
temps. Mais les deux systèmes se sont avérés inadéquats à traiter les 
problèmes actuels de Venvironnement et ils ont dû évoluer de façon à 
mieux faire face aux défis. 
La deuxième partie illustre, dans ses grandes lignes, les lacunes du 
système international et des règles de la responsabilité de l'Etat. Ces 
lacunes sont ancrées dans le cœur du système, concentré sur les intérêts 
des Etats souverains. Elles comprennent Vimprécision des règles, la mé-
sentente concernant le genre de responsabilité (faute ou responsabilité 
stricte), la considération de nombreuses activités polluantes comme « lé-
gales », le caractère réactif du système et l'incapacité du système à traiter 
convenablement les coûts écologiques plutôt que les dommages aux inté-
rêts de l'Etat. 
La troisième partie comprend Venumeration des développements et 
des orientations qui pourraient fournir des réponses aux problèmes men-
tionnés ci-dessus. Les solutions possibles comprennent l'établissement de 
règles protégeant les intérêts des Etats souverains de la communauté 
internationale, l'institution de régimes spéciaux de responsabilité pour les 
problèmes environnementaux plus précisément soulignés, les efforts de la 
Commission de droit international pour instituer un régime de respon-
sabilité pour risques et la diffusion des régimes conçus pour prévenir ou 
résoudre les problèmes de l'environnement. 
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1. State Responsibility in Context 
1.1 Municipal Law 
During the last two decades, the world has come to realize that human 
existence on Earth not only entails an ever-increasing number of environ-
mental problems, but also that these are increasingly serious, increasingly 
complex, and often irreversible1. No single tool at our disposal can provide 
a solution. Change must occur at all levels — societal, ethical, economic, 
scientific and legal2. Whichever the focus, however, it has become clear 
that concepts and assumptions inherited from previous generations will not 
be able to guide us into a sustainable future. Thus, legal orders which were 
built upon concerns and priorities of another era, now require reforms that 
render them more responsive to modern concerns. The «environmental 
crisis » is among these modern concerns which fundamentally challenge 
the building blocks of our legal systems. 
The quest for change transcends legal systems. Many countries of the 
world are currently engaged in debates about appropriate reforms3. Clas-
sical concepts such as the notion of property are unable to truly capture 
environmental harm4. Thus, along with efforts to make traditional private 
1. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stock-
holm Declaration), U.N. Doc. A/CONF/48/14/REV.l ; W O R L D COMMISSION ON E N -
VIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1987 ; WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, World Resources 1992-93 : A Guide to the 
Global Environment, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992 ; Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, reprinted in (1992) 31 Int'l Leg. Mat. 876. 
2. See E.U. VON WEIZSÄCKER, Erdpolitik: ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum 
Jahrhundert der Umwelt, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989; 
J.R. ENGEL and J.G. ENGEL (eds.), Ethics of Environment and Development : Global 
Challenge, International Response, London, Belhaven, 1990 ; J. M A C N E I L L , P. W I N -
SEMIUS and T. YAKUSHIJI, Beyond Interdependence : The Meshing of the World's Eco-
nomy and the Earth's Ecology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 
3. See M. BOTHE and L. G Ü N D L I N G , Neuere Tendenzen des Umweltrechts im internatio-
nalen Vergleich, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1990 ; W. H O F F M A N , « Germany's New 
Environmental Liability Act : Strict Liability for Facilities Causing Pollution », (1991) 38 
Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 27 ; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES , Amended 
Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, ( 19) 219 
final (June 27, 1991); COUNCIL O F EUROPE, Draft Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous for the Environment, reprinted in (1991) 21 
Environmental Policy and Law 270. 
4. See ONTARIO L A W REFORM COMMISSION, Report on Damages for Environmental Harm, 
Toronto, The Commission, 1990; D. D E W E E S , «The Role of Tort Law in Controlling 
Environmental Pollution », (1992) XVIII Canadian Public Policy 425 ; J. VON G E R L A C H , 
Privatrecht und Umweltschutz im System des Umweltrechts, Berlin, Duncker & Hum-
blot, 1989. 
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law concepts more receptive to environmental concerns5, we have wit-
nessed the proliferation and continuing reform of regulatory regimes6. This 
trend is not only rooted in the necessarily narrow focus of private law. It is 
also explained by the fact that an important function of the traditional 
approach, that of assigning responsibility and chanelling compensation, 
does not meet the challenge posed by environmental degradation. It does 
not provide for the cooperation, coordination, planning, prevention and 
flexibility necessary to respond to ecological needs7. While environmental 
problems may be framed in terms of interferences with property or other 
individual rights, traditional solutions, by definition, create an artificial 
individual context while leaving the larger ecological issue unaddressed. 
Reforms of these traditional approaches may promote more equitable 
solutions to the individual target context. By rendering private remedies 
more effective, they may even enhance the regime's preventive and cost-
internalizing aspects and thus its ecologically desirable side-effects8. Re-
forms, therefore, serve an important purpose in their own context. How-
ever, one must bear in mind the limitations of that context. 
1.2 International Law 
Giving consideration to the experience at the national level is instruc-
tive and serves to put the evolution of the international legal order into 
5. These efforts focus primarily on liberalizing restrictive standing rules, on establishing 
strict liability for certain types of harm, on creating more equitable evidentiary rules, and 
on remedying the failure of private law to capture ecological damage. See ONTARIO L A W 
R E F O R M COMMISSION, Report on the Law of Standing, Toronto, Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1989 ; F . GERTLER, P. MULDOON and M. VALIANTE, «Public Access to En-
vironmental Justice », in CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Sustainable Development in 
Canada: Options for Law Reform, Ottawa, Canadian Bar Association, 1990; TASK 
F O R C E ON THE O N T A R I O ENVIRONMENTAL B I L L OF RIGHTS, Report on the Ontario 
Environmental Bill of Rights, Toronto, Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 1992. 
Gesetz über die Umwelthaftung vom 10.12.1990, BGBl. 19901, 2634 (German Environ-
ment Liability Law) ; McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, [1972] 3 All 
E.R. 1008 (H.L.) ; Sindelt v. Abbott, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. S.C. 1980) ; Michie v. Great Lakes 
Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974) ; J. OLSON, « Shifting the Burden of Proof : How 
the Common Law Can Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic », (1990) 20 Envtl. 
L. 891 ; O N T A R I O L A W REFORM COMMISSION, op. cit., note 4. 
6. See K. W E B B , Regulatory Approaches to Pollution, Ottawa, Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, 1988 ; D.P. E M O N D , « Cooperation in Nature : A New Foundation for Environ-
mental Law », (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 323 ; L. GIROUX, « La loi sur la qualité de 
l'environnement : les principaux mécanismes et les recours civils », in BARREAU DU 
Q U É B E C , Développements récents en droit de ienvironnement (1991), Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Biais, 1991, p . 1. 
7. See D. D E W E E S , loc. cit., note 4, 439 ; D.P. E M O N D , loc. cit., note 6, 335. 
8. See D. D E W E E S , loc. cit., note 4. 
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perspective9. In extending the comparison of legal systems to the inter-
national level, striking parallels emerge. The sovereignty of states remains 
one of the foundations of the international legal system. Thus, in the early 
stages of the development of international environmental law, environ-
mental problems were defined in terms of interferences with a state's 
sovereign interests10. Comparable to the application of concepts such as 
abus de droit or nuisance in domestic systems, rules of international 
neighbourhood law developed to balance conflicting sovereign interests of 
states". Here, in the context of transboundary pollution, lie the roots of the 
most basic principle of customary international law, the notion that no state 
may use its territory or allow the use of it in such a way as to cause serious 
damage to the territory of another state12. 
This basic principle has since proven to be deficient in several re-
spects. First, it hinges on the ambiguous notion of « serious damage » and 
thus allows states to honour the rule in principle while citing scientific 
uncertainty or lack of proof to escape its application13. Secondly, the rule 
neither adequately protects resources shared by several states14, nor does 
it sufficiently protect the global «commons», i.e. spaces and environ-
9. Compare also S. GAINES, «International Principles for Transnational Environmental 
Liability : Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse ? », (1989) 30 
Harv. Infi LJ. 311. 
10. See supra, note 4 and accompanying text for parallel property focus at the municipal 
level. 
11. In the international context see P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, International Law and the 
Environment, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 83 ; A. Kiss, Droit international 
de l'environnement, Paris, Pedone, 1989, p. 8 ; J. BRUNNÉE, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer 
Depletion : International Law and Regulation, Dobbs Ferry, Transnational Publishers, 
1988, p. 87. 
12. See Trail Smelter Arbitration, (1941) III U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905. 
13. See P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, pp. 98-99 ; J. B R U N N É E , op. cit., note 11, 
p. 136 ; A. Kiss and D. SHELTON, International Environmental Law, Ardsley-on-Hud-
son, Transnational Publishers, 1991, p. 115. 
14. See G. H A N D L , « Balancing of Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of 
International Watercourses», (1975) 13 Can. Y.B. Infi L. 156; on reform efforts in 
response to these shortcomings see infra, note 50 and accompanying text and INTER-
NATIONAL L A W ASSOCIATION, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers—Report of the 52 nd Conference, London, The Association, 1966, p. 447 ; U N I T E D 
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Principles of Conduct Relating to Natural Re-
sources Shared by Two or More States, UNEP/IG.12/2 (1978) ; INTERNATIONAL L A W 
COMMISSION, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, 43rd Session 1991, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.463 Add. 4. 
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mental resources beyond the jurisdiction of states15. Thirdly, the tra-
ditional approach to enforcement of international law relies on the rules of 
state responsibility. However, like the national norms on delictual respon-
sibility16, the law of state responsibility struggles with both the limitations 
of the legal system it is to enforce and the shortcomings inherent in its 
purpose. In the following pages, this paper will outline the broad features of 
the state responsibility debate. It will survey the classical theory of state 
responsibility, its shortcomings in the environmental context and the range 
of possible solutions. It will conclude with some observations about recent 
trends. 
2. State Responsibility—Theory, Problems and Evolution 
2.1 The Theory of State Responsibility 
The theory of state responsibility is concerned with the consequences 
of internationally wrongful acts17. A breach of a customary or treaty-based 
rule of international law gives rise to the responsibility of the contravening 
state. According to classical theory, physical damage is not necessarily a 
requirement of state responsibility, as violations of a state's international 
rights can cause (immaterial) damage to the state concerned18. However, 
this statement must be qualified in the context of rules, such as the basic 
15. The scope of the rule has since been widened to encompass common spaces. See Princi-
ple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, supra, note 1, at : « States have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own natural resources pursuant to their own environmental policies 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. » See infra, note 50 and accompanying text for further developments. 
16. See supra, notes 7, 8 and accompanying text. 
17. Note that the theory is thus concerned with the states' own obligations and not with those 
of private entities. In the environmental context state responsibility therefore usually re-
volves around duties of regulation, control or cooperation ; see P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, 
op. cit., note 11, p. 140. On the law of state responsibility more generally see I. BROWN-
LIE, System of the Law of Nations : State Responsibility, 4th ed., Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990; P.-M. DUPUY, «The International Law of State Responsibility : 
Revolution or Evolution ? », (1989) 11 Mich. J. Infi L. 105, 109-112 ; INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION, « Draft Articles on State Responsibility », Article 1, in Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 1980. 
18. See K. ZEMANEK, «Causes and Forms of International Liability», in B. CHENG and 
E.D. BROWN, (eds.), Contemporary Problems of International Law : Essays in Honour 
of Georg Schwarzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 
1988, p. 323 ; see also Corfu Channel case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4, 35 ; The I'm 
Alone case, III R.I.A.A. 1609. 
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rule of international environmental law described above, which rely on 
damage to determine when a violation occurs19. 
The breach of a (primary) rule of international law triggers certain 
secondary obligations20. These are commonly considered to include the 
duties to: 1) discontinue the act ; 2) apply national legal remedies ; 3) re-
establish the situation existing before the act in question, or to the extent 
that this is impossible, pay corresponding compensation ; 4) provide guar-
antees against repetition21. If necessary to induce the violating state to 
honour these secondary obligations, injured states may also resort to 
reprisals or the suspension of their treaty obligations vis-à-vis the former22. 
According to traditional theory, state responsibility triggers a relationship 
only between the violating state(s) and the immediate victim state(s)23. 
Classical international law does not recognize an actio popularis entitling 
all states to respond to violation of its rules or to demand compensation24. 
The principle of state responsibility is firmly established in inter-
national law25. Therefore, it should be equally applicable to cases involving 
transboundary environmental harm and thus provide for the enforcement 
19. This basic rule only prohibits activities which cause serious transboundary harm, see 
supra, note 12 and accompanying text. Note that the INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 
loc. cit., note 17, fails to consider this aspect. See also G. HANDL, «Territorial Sover-
eignty and the Problem of Transnational Polution », (1975) 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 50. 
20. See A. BOYLE, « State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Con-
sequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?», 
(W0)39Infl & Comp. L. Q. 1, 10;S.GAINES, «Taking Responsibility for Transbound-
ary Environmental Effects », (1991) 14 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 781, 787. 
21. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, « Draft Articles on State Responsibility », Arti-
cle 6, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1984, 2. The 
list of secondary obligations can be traced back to the decision of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case, [1928] P.C.I.J. Reports, Ser. A, 
No. 17, where the Court held at 47, 48 that « reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out 
the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed ». 
22. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, loc. cit., note 21, articles 8-13; M. AKEHURST, 
A Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th ed., London, Unwin & Hyman, 1988, 
p. 211;Naulilaa case, [1928] 2 R.I.A.A. 1012. 
23. See K. ZEMANEK, loc. cit., note 18, at 322; P.-M. DUPUY, loc. cit., note 17, 118; 
P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, p. 154. 
24. The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) rejected the argument that international law 
accepted the actio popularis in the South West Africa case, [1966] I.C.J. 4, 47 (Second 
Phase) ; see also J. CHARNEY, «Third State Remedies in International Law », (1989) 10 
Mich. Int'l L.J. 57, 60; and infra, note 50 and accompanying text on more recent 
developments that are eroding this narrow focus of the law of state responsibility. 
25. See Chorzow Factory case, supra, note 21. 
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of international environmental law-6. However, not only do a multitude of 
problems plague the theory of state responsibility itself, there are also 
various difficulties particular to its application in the environmental 
context. 
2.2 Problems and Limitations 
A first limitation is rooted in the vagueness of the very rules the 
violation of which triggers state responsibility. Given the use of general 
terms such as « serious damage », the threshold at which a violation occurs 
is often elusive27. This is particularly true for the complex environmental 
problems of our times and the attendant scientific uncertainty. In addition, 
the multilateral and often global character of these problems makes the 
pinpointing of responsible states and victims virtually impossible28. Fi-
nally, in their generality, customary norms do not provide the precise 
standards that are required for a solution to modern problems29. 
The vagueness of the relevant rules can be explained largely by the 
features that gave rise to the perception of international law as a « primi-
tive » legal system30. Whether one agrees with this label or not, states 
continue to be the primary subjects of international law as well the primary 
law-makers, enforcers and adjudicators, so that their interests significantly 
shape the content of rules31. Thus, apart from early cases dealing with 
relatively localized transboundary annoyances32, states have not pursued 
pollution incidents to an extent that would have allowed the formation of 
26. See A. R E S T , « Responsibility and Liability for Transboundary Air Pollution Damage », in 
C. F U N T E R M A N , B. KWIATKOWSKA and J. LAMMERS (eds.), Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion : International Legal Aspects of the Cooperation of States, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, 299 at 317-318; for sceptical opinions see L. GÜNDLING, 
« Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten für grenzüberschreitende Umweltbeinträchtigungen », 
(1985) 45 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 265 ; ANONY-
MOUS, « International Environmental Law », (1991) 104 H arv. Infi L.J. 1484,1499-1511. 
27. See supra, note 13 and accompanying text. 
28. Consider ozone layer depletion and attempts to assign responsibility for harm to a 
particular state ; see J. B R U N N É E , op. cit., note 11, p. 140; note also that the largely 
reactive responsibility model per se is not capable of addressing the problem itself; see 
infra, note 45 and accompanying text. 
29. See P. B IRNIE and A. B O Y L E , op. cit., note 11, p. 134. 
30. Id., p. 549. 
31. See A. CASSESE, International Law in a Divided World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1986; J. B R U N N É E , «Common Interest—Echoes from and Empty Shell? Some 
Thoughts on Common Interest and International Environmental Law », (1989) 49 Zeit-
schriftfür ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 792. 
32. See TrailSmelterca.se, supra, note 12 ; LacLanoux Arbitration, (1957) XIIR.I .A.A. 315. 
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more specific rules33. The more complex environmental problems be-
come, the more the solutions involve the economic interests and sovereign 
spheres of states34. Intent on protecting their sovereign interests and on 
retaining control over sovereign affairs, states hesitate to create preced-
ents35. The evolution of generally applicable principles would carve into 
the sovereign realm of states in a potentially unpredictable range of si-
tuations. Given the impossibility of avoiding all transboundary impact, 
states are also reluctant to create precedents which might subsequently 
work to their disadvantage. Furthermore, the ecological links between 
states cannot be separated from their economic and political relations. For 
all these reasons, even clear cases of violations of international law such as 
the Sandoz spill in the Rhine, the Chernobyl reactor incident or the Gulf 
War have not been followed by a pursuit of available state responsibility 
channels36. 
Seen against this background, it is hardly surprising that there also has 
been little agreement as to the applicable standard of liability. Traditional 
theory relies on a standard of due diligence and efforts to deduce or develop 
a strict liability regime cannot be considered reflective of international 
custom37. Neither international practice nor the scarce precedents permit 
33. Accordingly, there was no opportunity for the International Court of Justice or inter-
national arbitration tribunals to interpret notions such as « serious damage » to assist the 
development of customary international law in a way comparable to the contribution of 
courts in civil and common law systems. 
34. Consider the example of climate change ; a solution could not be based on limitations to 
individual areas of national activity ; an effective international regime would have im-
plications for virtually all sectors of national life and would place an unprecedented 
burden on national financial resources. See S. MASSEY, «Global Warming — Inter-
national Environmental Agreements — The 1992 United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development Most Likely Will Not Culminate in a Successfully Pre-
ventive Global Warming Treaty Without the United States' Support », (1992) 22 Ga. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. 175. 
35. P. BiRNiEandA. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, p. 159; A. SPRINGER, The International Law of 
Pollution, Westport, Quorum Books, 1983, p. 130. 
36. See P. SANDS, The International Law of Liability for Transboundary Nuclear Pollu-
tion, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1989; A. REST, «Tschernobyl und die inter-
nationale Haftung — Volkerrechtliche Aspekte », (1989) 37 Versicherungsrecht 609 and 
«The Sandoz Conflagration and Rhine Pollution : Liability Issues », (1987) 30 German 
Yearbook of International Law 160 ; A. SCHWABACH, «The Sandoz Spill : The Failure of 
International Law to Protect the Rhine from Pollution », (1989) 16 Ecology L.Q. 443 ; 
C. JOYNER and J. KIRKHOPE, « The Persian Gulf War Oil Spill : Reassessing the Law of 
Environmental Protection and the Law of Armed Conflict», (1992) 24 Case W. Res. 
J. Int'l L. 29. 
37. Pointing to the parallels in the national debate of liability standards see K. ZEMANEK, 
loc. cit., note 18, 327; on the continuing validity of the due diligence standard see 
P.-M. DUPUY, loc. cit., note 17, 114. 
836 Les Cahiers de Droit (1993) 34 C. de D. 827 
the conclusion that strict liability is the standard generally applicable to 
environmental injury38. In fact, states have avoided statements that would 
allow any conclusion as to the relevant standard39. For this reason alone it 
is doubtful that the work invested by the International Law Commission in 
developing a strict liability regime applicable, inter alia, to environmental 
damage will win the support of states in the near future40. Only in the 
context of ultra-hazardous activities is there evidence of the acceptance, 
albeit within the confines of individual treaties, of strict liability41. 
Beyond the theoretical difficulties outlined above, further problems 
arise from the fact that many environmental concerns are side-effects of 
activities essential to our modern societies. It is, therefore, argued that 
state responsibility and the resulting duty to cease violations of inter-
national law are unrealistic in the context of modern life42. Furthermore, it 
is suggested that many activities are not captured by traditional state 
responsibility theory43. According to this second argument, the operation 
of factories, motor vehicles, power plants, is not prohibited by inter-
national law, so that there is no obligation to cease or modify these activ-
ities or to compensate for injury. As will be pointed out below, both of these 
38. See G. H A N D L , loc. cit., note 14, 167-170; G. DOEKER and T. GEHRING, «Private or 
International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage : The Precedent of 
Conventional Liability Regimes », (1990) 2 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 2 ; but see 
for the opposite conclusion: J. SCHNEIDER, «State Responsibility for Environmental 
Protection and Preservation», in R. FALK, F . KRATOCHWIL and S.M. MENDLOVITZ 
(eds.), International Law : A Contemporary Perspective,Boulder, West view Press, 1985, 
602 at 618 ; A. SPRINGER, op. cit., note 35, pp. 133-134. 
39. See Article 235 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in (1982) 
21 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1261, which merely refers to the rules of international law ; or note 1 to 
Article 9(f) of the 1979 ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
reprinted in (1979) 18 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1442, which states that the « Convention does not 
contain a rule on State liability as to damage ». 
40. See INTERNATIONAL L A W COMMISSION, «Report on Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law », in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1984, p. 15 ; see further infra, note 85 
and accompanying text. 
41. See infra, notes 58-62 and accompanying text ; see also G. H A N D L , «Liability as an 
Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law », (1985) 16 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 49, 58-61, who argues that even in the context of ultra-
hazardous activities strict liability is not part of general international law. 
42. The International Law Commission is the primary proponent of this conception, see 
INTERNATIONAL L A W COMMISSION, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
Vol. II, Part One, 1982, p . 60, para. 39; see also K. ZEMANEK, loc. cit., note 18, 326. 
43. See INTERNATIONAL L A W COMMISSION, Yearbook of the International Law Commis-
sion, Vol. II, Part 1, 1981, p. 122, para. 85, et Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol. II, Part 1, 1986, p. 152, para. 31. 
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lines of argument are erroneous and, from the perspective of environmen-
tal protection, misguided44. 
While the alleged gap in the coverage of environmentally harmful 
activities by the law of state responsibility may present a problem if 
considered from a compensatory perspective, a more serious shortcoming 
is inherent in this very dimension of state responsibility. Apart from the 
deterrence function it might assume were it to work more effectively, state 
responsibility is of a largely reactive character. Secondary obligations are 
only triggered once environmental harm has already occurred45. This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, experience has shown that much envi-
ronmental damage cannot be compensated or reversed. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, solutions to most modern environmental prob-
lems require pro-active management and are thus beyond the scope of what 
the theory of state responsibility is conceptually able to provide. In addi-
tion, state responsibility is based upon a confrontational paradigm that 
runs counter to the cooperation required to manage the international envi-
ronment46. 
Finally, when considering the damage captured by traditional state 
responsibility principles, it becomes apparent that true ecological costs and 
systemic damage are not adequately covered47. This failure has both prac-
tical and conceptual reasons. At the practical level, difficulties arise in the 
valuation of resources and proof or assessment of damage. Conceptually, 
the territorial underpinnings of most customary rules exclude damage to 
resources beyond national jurisdiction from the range of circumstances in 
which states could demand discharge of secondary obligations. 
In briefly returning to this article's comparative point of departure, it 
should be noted that the aforementioned problems find parallels at the 
national level. Some problems, such as the vagueness of rules and the 
sovereignty dimension may be typical of the international legal order. 
However, national environmental lawyers will be only too familiar with 
concerns over expediency and non-enforcement of available rules, the 
protection of common resources, the compensation of ecological damage, 
and the discussion about merits and feasibility of a strict liability regime. 
44. See infra, notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
45. J. BRUNNÉE, op. cit., note 11, p. 112. 
46. See P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, p. 136. 
47. See H.-U. MARTICKE, «Liability for Ecological Damage», (1992) 22 Environmental 
Policy and Law 28 ; A. REST, « Ecological Damage in Public International Law », (1992) 
22 Environmental Policy and Law 31. 
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2.3 The Range of Solutions 
The first and perhaps most obvious possibility for improvement would 
be to address the shortcomings of the primary norms of international 
environmental law. Efforts to develop more effective rules long focused on 
the procedural realm and cooperative concepts such as information, noti-
fication or consultation48. Substantively, the more recent restatements of 
the general rules have not increased their specificity when compared to the 
classical formulation of Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration49. 
However, they have begun to widen their scope to encompass spaces and 
environmental resources beyond national jurisdiction as well as future 
generations50. The emerging principles are evidence that states are moving 
to acknowledge that their responsibility extends to protecting the environ-
ment in the «common interest of the international community51 ». The 
need to protect the « commons » and environmental life support systems 
upon which all nations depend may thus lead to the recognition of environ-
mental norms with effect erga omnes52. All states would be bound by these 
rules and each state, even if not directly and individually affected, could 
48. Most notable in this context are the work of the International Law Association as 
embodied in : INTERNATIONAL L A W ASSOCIATION , Montreal Rules of International Law 
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, 1982. 
49. For the text of Principle 21 see supra, note 15 ; subsequent formulations include Prin-
ciple 3 of the UNEP Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment Concerning 
Resources Shared by Two or More States, UNEP/IG/12/2 (1978) ; Principles 21, 22 of the 
World Charter for Nature, UNG A Res. 37/7,28 Oct. 1982, reprinted in (1983) 23 Int 7 Leg. 
Mat. 455; Article 10 of the Legal Principles formulated by the Experts Group on 
Environmental Law of the W O R L D COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT and DEVELOPMENT, 
op. cit., note 1, p. 349 [hereinafter WCED Experts Principles] ; and Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5, 7 May 1992, 
reprinted in (1992) 31 Infi Leg. Mat. 876. 
50. See Principles 2, 3 of the WCED Experts Principles, supra, note 49 ; Principles 2, 3 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra, note 49 ; The Hague Declara-
tion on the Environment, reprinted in (1989) 28 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1380 ; Bergen Ministerial 
Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECERegion, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/ 
PC 10/Annex I, 6 August 1990, reprinted in (1990) 1 Yearbook of International Environ-
mental Law, 429. 
51. See J. B R U N N É E , loc. cit., note 31. 
52. Id., 801 ; P.-M. D U P U Y , loc. cit., note 17, 119; and, significantly, see the most recent 
deliberations of the INTERNATIONAL L A W COMMISSION, Report of the International Law 
Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991), 303; some 
members felt the Commission should «come in touch [...] with the general orientation of 
the international community, which was increasingly asserting the importance of pro-
tecting the « global commons » ». It was argued that « [a]t the very least, the Commission 
should work out a more detailed definition of the meaning of an obligation erga omnes [...] 
and determine [...] conditions for the exercise of an actio popularis with regard to the 
resources of the «global commons » ». 
J. BRUNNÉE State Responsibility in International Law 839 
demand compliance . Such a development would contribute significantly 
to the closing of the gap left by the current focus of the theory of state 
responsibility. 
However, given the potentially enormous implications of recognizing 
generally applicable rules, states have preferred other approaches when 
creating compensation and environmental protection regimes. All of these 
« preferred » approaches are characterized by being less invasive of the 
states' sovereign spheres. They either single out a narrow sector with 
clearly defined obligations, or they avoid the issue of state responsibility in 
the traditional sense altogether. The latter approach is common in the 
context of general environmental risk. Most modern environmental protec-
tion agreements make no mention of state responsibility for harm caused54, 
limit themselves to a reference to the general rules of international law55, or 
even explicitely exclude the issue of responsibility56. These approaches 
essentially amount to maintaining the status quo, i.e. the ambiguous state 
of the law of state responsibility, while addressing the environmental 
problem at hand through international cooperation57. 
In the context of ultra-hazardous activities, narrowly defined regimes 
have been able to establish more effective liability schemes. Yet rather 
than addressing the controversial area of state responsibility, these regimes 
typically establish frameworks for the civil liability of those undertaking 
the activity in question58. They aim to distribute losses in the case of certain 
activities considered socially and economically beneficial despite high 
risks of accidental damage59. Thus, while the activity is not per se harmful 
to the environment, accidents may result in serious environmental damage. 
The transportation of oil by sea and the operation of nuclear power plants 
are classical examples of activities that fall into this category60. Generally, 
the applicable regimes impose strict liability on operators while tempering 
the severity of the approach by excluding certain consequences from 
53. See P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, pp. 154-157. 
54. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, reprinted in (1987) 26 Int'l 
Leg. Mat. 1529. 
55. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra, note 39. 
56. See supra, note 39. 
57. See infra, notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
58. The only regime providing for the absolute responsibility of states is the 1972 Convention 
on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. For details on civil 
liability regimes see G. DOEKER and T. GEHRING, loc. cit., note 38, 4-8. 
59. See G. DOEKER and T. GEHRING, « Liability for Environmental Damage », in P. SAND 
(ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, Cambridge, Gro-
tius Publications, 1992, p. 393. 
60. See accordingly the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, reprinted in 
(1963) 2 Int'l Leg. Mat. 121, and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, reprinted in (1970) 9 Int'l Leg. Mat. 45. 
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liability and establishing liability ceilings61. In addition, those subject to the 
regimes are usually required to take out sufficient insurance coverage62. At 
times, these regimes also establish international compensation funds63. As 
is clear from these features, the regimes are based on the premise that the 
covered activities must continue and that attendant risks can be adequately 
addressed by way of a compensation scheme. 
What should have emerged from the preceding discussion is that states 
have been reluctant to apply the existing rules, let alone to develop the law 
of state responsibility. Be it reluctance to use the label of « violation of 
international law », or concern over the development of onerous rules 
— the law of state responsibility does not currently produce satisfactory 
results. As mentioned above, some have also considered its rules as un-
suited to deal effectively with the environmentally harmful consequences 
of our modern way of life. 
The International Law Commission (ILC), the United Nations body 
established to codify rules of international law64, decided in 1978 to divide 
its work in the field into two separate topics65. In addition to its Draft 
61. See Article V of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (note that 
this Convention imposes absolute liability, Articles II, IV), supra, note 60 ; and Arti-
cles IV and V of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
supra, note 60. 
62. See Article VII of the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and Article VII 
of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra, 
note 60 ; note that the Nuclear Damage Convention contains an element of state respon-
sibility in that the licensing state of a facility must ensure payment of compensation 
beyond insurance coverage. 
63. See the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, reprinted in (1972) 11 Int'l Leg. Mat. 284. 
64. The work of the International Law Commission (ILC) was successful in a number of 
areas. It was adopted, for example, in the cases of the Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted 
in (1969) 8 Int'l Leg. Mat. 679. 
65. The ILC began its work aiming to codify the traditional law of state responsibility. 
Decades of work yielded the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the 
International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 
(1980), without being able to generate substantial agreement on the topic. Debate of the 
topic continues, see Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992). In 1978, the Commission began to work on a second 
topic and produced the «Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Con-
sequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law », see Report of the 
International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 
(1990). More recently the ILC has been working on a third topic and the Draft Code of 
Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Com-
mission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/45/10 (1990). This last topic is 
concerned not with the responsibility of States, but with that of individuals committing 
acts considered to be international crimes. 
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Articles on State Responsibility, it began to work on the Draft Articles on 
Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by Inter-
national Law. The title of the undertaking, indicative of its complexity, also 
captures its key theoretical underpinnings66. The Commission's assump-
tion is that a large range of modern activities may not (yet) be prohibited 
by international law while having harmful consequences for other states 
which should not remain uncompensated67. Since the inception of the 
topic, debate has been controversial in many respects. In particular, the 
Commission continues to struggle with the basis of liability68. In this 
context it should not be forgotten that the very idea of imposing strict 
liability on states meets with resistance69. Authors have also taken issue 
with the ILC's move toward reliance on the creation of « appreciable risk » 
rather than on actual transboundary harm as the source of liability70. Yet 
others have criticized that the ILC's regime creates merely a « negotiable 
duty71 », as a balancing of the states' interests according to criteria such as 
66. See D. BARSTOW-MAGRAW, «Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commis-
sion's Study of International Liability », (1986) 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 305 ; M. AKEHURST, 
« International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited 
by International Law », (1985) 16 Netherlands Int'l L.J. 3. 
67. According to the ILC, « state responsibility » is thus concerned with violations of inter-
national law and its consequences, while the notion of « liability » is concerned with the 
consequences of legal activities. Authors such as A. BOYLE, loc. cit., note 20, 8-10, have 
sharply criticized the Commission's terminology and its theoretical basis. In response to 
these criticisms, the ILC has acknowledged that the two topics overlap ; see most 
recently : Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992) at 104. 
68. See most recently Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990) at 246-251 and Report of the International Law 
Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992) at 103-106 ; id., at 
102-103, the Commission also acknowledged that its work on procedural obligations 
within the framework of the Draft Articles may be misconceived as a breach of such 
obligations would entail state responsibility. 
69. See supra, note 38, 39 and accompanying text on the reluctance of states to support strict 
liability regimes and their efforts to « de-emphasize their own responsibility by adopting 
civil liability schemes » ; P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, p. 146. 
70. Foradetaileddiscussionofthe attendant theoretical difficulties seeC. O 'KEEFE, «Trans-
boundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue : The Work of the International Law 
Commission on the Topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising 
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law », (1990) 18 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 145. 
71. G. HANDL, «Liability as an Obligation Established as a Primary Rule of International 
Law : Some Basic Reflections on the International Law Commission's Work », (1985) 16 
Netherlands Int'l L.J. 49, 72. 
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probability and extent of injury, importance of the activity, and economic 
viability, would determine the states' actual obligations72. 
Most importantly, however, the majority of writers consider the con-
ceptual framework of the topic to be fundamentally flawed73. Some charge 
that the topic could be effectively addressed within the traditional state 
responsibility topic if one was to recognize the existence of strict liability in 
addition to the generally recognized fault standard74. Others rightly point 
out that the topic is wrongly extended beyond activities which entail the 
risk of disastrous consequences in the case of an accident but otherwise 
have no adverse impact, to activities which cause continuous and thus 
foreseeable harm75. In these latter cases, it is argued, it is the state respon-
sibility regime that applies since the causation of serious transboundary 
harm is prohibited by international law76. The consequence should be the 
cessation of the violation which, in turn, does not normally involve cessa-
tion of the activity, but merely its modification to comply with international 
standards77. One might add that stopping the violation is not only the 
consequence required by international law, it is also more ecologically 
sound than the « pollute and pay » approach inherent in the ILC's liability 
topic78. 
All the difficulties inherent in the state responsibility approach, as well 
as the need for proactive responses to environmental problems have led to 
the proliferation of international agreements establishing cooperative en-
vironmental protection regimes79. The emphasis of these regimes is on 
72. See the ILC's initial « Schematic Outline », reprinted in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1982, ss. 3-5 ; see also Article 17 of the current Draft 
Articles, reprinted and discussed in the Report of the International Law Commission to 
the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990) at 264. 
73. See A. B O Y L E , loc. cit., note 20, 1, who considers the topic «liable to seem at best a 
questionable exercise in reconceptualising an existing body of law, or at worst, a dan-
gerously retrograde step which may seriously weaken international efforts to secure 
agreement of effective principles of international environmental law » ; P.-M. D U P U V , 
loc. cit., note 17, 113, who speaks of «profound theoretical and practical difficulties ». 
74. See P. BIRNIE and A. B O Y L E , op. cit., note 11, p. 149 ; see also P.-M. D U P U Y , loc. cit., 
note 17, 109-112. 
75. See in particular G. H A N D L , loc. cit., note 71, 56-59 ; see also K. ZEMANEK, loc. cit., 
note 18, 331-332, who, however, merely argues one should consequently distinguish 
between liability for the risk of accidents and liability for harmful activity. 
76. See G. H A N D L , loc. cit., note 71, 59; P.-M. DUPUY, loc. cit., note 17, 117. 
77. See P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 11, p. 141, who point out that not the activity, 
but the resulting harm is prohibited by international law. 
78. The « pollute and pay » approach would appear to be no longer justifiable in the context of 
frequently irreversible environmental damage. 
79. See for example the extensive list compiled by P. BIRNIE and A. BOYLE, op. cit., note 1J, 
pp. XI-XXVII. 
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the prevention and mitigation of environmental harm . As problems such 
as long-range transboundary air pollution, ozone layer depletion or cli-
mate change cannot be addressed without international cooperation, states 
are increasingly willing to take on obligations within cooperative treaty 
frameworks. Within these frameworks, general obligations to cooperate, 
exchange information, collect data or provide technical assistance are 
gradually complemented by specific emission reduction targets81. Such 
regimes attempt to invite adherence by creating « win-win situations » in 
which all states can claim to cooperate to protect the environment and 
which contribute to the environmental benefit no state can achieve alone82. 
More recently, states have come to recognize their « common but differen-
tiated » responsibility to bear the burden of international environmental 
protection83. Not only is there a recognition of the differing priorities and 
abilities between industrialized and developing countries. More import-
antly, industrialized countries have begun to acknowledge their predomi-
nant share in the creation of global environmental problems. 
One may thus argue that, ironically, a new form of « state respon-
sibility » has emerged. While states avoid the step of establishing that 
international norms were violated, they do accept an obligation to take 
steps against the degradation of the global environment. Furthermore, 
while no traditional state responsibility link is established, states are in-
creasingly ready to bear the burden of environmental protection in propor-
tion to their shares in the causation of the problem at hand84. It remains to 
be seen whether this phenomenon can consolidate from a mere response to 
danger into a stable legal concept. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks and Recent Trends 
After this brief account one may be inclined to ask whether there is any 
role to play for state responsibility in the context of environmental protec-
tion. My answer would be « yes ». However, as in the national context, one 
must bear in mind what this role can realistically be in light of both the 
80. See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra, note 39 ; Vienna 
Convention/or the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra, note 54 ; Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, reprinted in (1992) 31 Int'l Leg. Mat. 831. 
81. See J. BRUNNÉE, op. cit., note 11, pp. 266-267. 
82. On recent trends in international treaty-making see P. SAND, « International Coopera-
tion : The Environmental Experience », in J. TUCHMAN MATTHEWS (ed.), Preserving the 
Global Environment : The Challenge of Shared Leadership, New York, W.W. Norton, 
1991, 236. 
83. Id., 244-246 ; and see Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra, note 80, art. 4. 
84. Note, however, that there currently is no « perfect » proportionality as the U.N. pay scale 
normally applies to industrialized countries' contributions to international agreements. 
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particularities of the system and the requirements of effective environmen-
tal protection. 
In this vein, recent years have witnessed numerous efforts to revitalize 
and renew the law of state responsibility and liability in the context of 
environmental protection. An emerging trend is the reliance on civil liabil-
ity regimes either exclusively or in combination with state liability or 
responsibility. Another common theme is the focus on forms of strict 
liability while avoiding the issue of international wrongfulness85. Finally, 
international liability schemes are beginning to give consideration to ecol-
ogical damage and the restoration of environmental resources86. 
The Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment is the 
most comprehensive attempt to develop a civil liability regime87. The draft 
convention attaches the civil liability of operators to damage resulting 
from a wide range of dangerous activities involving, inter alia, dangerous 
substances and dangerous genetically modified organisms88. Contracting 
states must ensure that operators active in their territories obtain adequate 
insurance coverage89. 
More narrowly defined civil liability regimes are currently envisaged 
by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and by the contracting states of the Basel Convention on the Transbound-
ary Movement of Hazardous Wastes90. 
85. The exception would appear to be the ILC's Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see Report of the International Law 
Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) at 161 ; Draft 
Article 8 stipulates that « Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse 
[system] in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States ». 
While some members of the Commission considered that a violation of the provision 
would result in strict liability, the majority perceived such a violation as an « internation-
ally wrongful act » ; see S. M C C A F F R E Y , «The International Law Commission and Its 
Efforts to Codify the International Law of Waterways », (1990) XVIII Annuaire suisse de 
droit international 32, 52-54. 
86. See A. REST, loc. cit., note 47. 
87. Council of Europe Paper DIR/JUR(91)3, reprinted in (1991) 21 Environmental Policy and 
Law 270. 
88. Id., Article 2. 
89. Id., Article 13. 
90. The Legal Committee of IMO is considering a Draft International Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea ; see ( 1992) 22 Environmental Policy and Law 311. An ad hoc 
Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts is currently working on a Liability 
Protocol to the Basel Convention ; see (1991) 21 Environmental Policy and Law 49. 
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Perhaps the most progressive initiative is the Economic Commission 
for Europe's (ECE) Draft Guidelines on Responsibility and Liability re-
garding Transboundary Water Pollution91. The draft guidelines combine 
strict liability for the consequences of certain hazardous activities with the 
responsibility of states for the breach of legal duties92. In doing so, the 
drafters seek to address the inability of civil liability schemes to capture the 
international and ecological dimensions of environmental harm93. Con-
sequently, the guidelines include « detrimental changes in ecosystems » 
and the costs of restoration in the definition of damage94. 
In conclusion, one cannot hope to solve complex environmental prob-
lems by way of an essentially reactive responsibility regime95. However, it 
is possible to devise mechanisms that could complement and reinforce the 
necessary proactive approaches96. Such mechanisms must be mindful of 
the limitations of the responsibility approch and must seek to focus on 
narrow areas of application or established fields of international coopera-
tion and practice. Recent efforts suggest that the international community 
has recognized the role that responsibility or liability regimes can play. 
91. Doc. ECE/ENVWA/TFLR 90/WP6 ; they are to complement the Code of Conduct on 
Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters adopted by the Economic Com-
mission for Europe at its forty-fifth session by decision C(45), Doc. E/ECE/1225 ; ECE/ 
ENVWA/16. 
92. For a detailed discussion see A. REST, « New Tendencies in Environmental Liability/Re-
sponsibility Law », (1991) 21 Environmental Policy and Law 135, 136. Note that the more 
recent work of the ILC also relies on a combination of state and civil liability ; see Report 
of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 
(1990) at 279. 
93. See A. REST, «Effektiveres Internationales Umwelthaftungsrecht durch verbesserte 
Sanktionsmechanismen und einen neuen UN Umweltgerichtshof », (1991) 11-12 Umwelt-
und Planungsrecht 417, 419. 
94. See the Guidelines, supra, note 91, under «A. Definitions ». 
95. Note in this context that the deterrence effect of the international responsibility regime is 
manifestly smaller than that of its national counterparts. 
96. A. REST, loc. cit., note 92, 135, argues that instruments of legal responsibility and liability 
can contribute to changing « toothless paper tiger conventions into effective, operation-
able agreements ». One should bear in mind, however, that the very absence of respon-
sibility or liability provisions may be essential to the success of many environmental 
protection agreements. 
